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THE MILITARY AND STATE-SECRETS
PRIVILEGE: THE QUIETLY EXPANDING POWER
Erin M. Stilp+
Imagine living in a country where the government could pluck a
person from an airport, send him to Syria to be tortured, and there
existed no recourse to hold that government responsible. If you live in
the United States of America, you may live in such a country. Under the
current presidential administration's interpretation of the military and
state-secrets privilege (state-secrets privilege), it is possible that your
government lies beyond the reach of all discipline.
The state-secrets privilege,' a creation of common law,2 is only
available to the government3 and is intended to protect national security.4
The privilege permits the government to refuse discovery requests where
"there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged."'
Early cases addressing the state-secrets privilege often excluded
evidence for which the privilege was asserted, but permitted the case to
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The
author would like to thank her father, Brig. Gen. James P. Cullen (ret.), and her Note & Comment
Editor, Gordon Jimison, for their guidance throughout the writing process.
1. The state-secrets privilege is defined as "[a] privilege that the government may
invoke against the discovery of a material that, if divulged, could compromise national
security." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1237 (8th ed. 2004); see also Jeffrey J. Lauderdale,
A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement Privilege and the Proper Use
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New Privileges, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
255, 269-70 (2005) (clarifying the distinction between the state-secrets privilege from the
executive privilege which protects communications between the executive and his
advisors). The general executive privilege gained recognition when invoked by President
Nixon. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Lauderdale, supra, at 269-70. The
Supreme Court held that Nixon's "generalized" request for confidentiality did not fit
within the state-secrets privilege, noting the subpoenaed material contained no "military
or diplomatic secrets." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953); Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14, 692d).
3. See Reynolds, 345 U.S, at 7 (noting that state-secrets privilege "belongs to the
Government and must be asserted by it").
4. See, e.g., id. at 10 (discussing the need to hide military state-secrets in the name of
national interests); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that
discovery may be blocked if it adversely affects national security).
5. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
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continue. 6 However, a trend has developed in which the state-secrets
privilege is used as a basis to dismiss entire cases rather than block a
discovery request Because "[tihe very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury," 8 the increased use of this privilege
to dismiss a case requires careful scrutiny.9 Theoretically, the judicial
branch acts as a final check on the invocation of this privilege.0
However, judges have extended broad deference to the executive branch
by granting nearly every invocation of the state-secrets privilege since its
formal recognition in 1953."
This Comment first explores the historical roots of the state-secrets
privilege and the potential for its abuse. Next, this Comment highlights
the evolution of the privilege, especially in the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Reynolds.2 An evaluation of the
three current effects of invoking the state-secrets privilege follows, with
particular attention paid to the impact of dismissing an entire case. This
Comment then presents three analyses suggesting that the recent
expansive use of the state-secrets privilege moves away from the original
narrow purpose of the privilege. The Comment uses two recent cases,
6. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 23-27, 70 and accompanying text.
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch), 163 (1803).
9. See Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Liberty, Security, and
the Courts (Apr. 14, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html). Justice Breyer stated that times of national
emergency often see two extreme positions:
The first says that, insofar as war is concerned, the Constitution does not really
matter. That is wrong. The Constitution always matters, perhaps particularly so
in times of emergency. The second says that, insofar as the Constitution is
concerned, war or security emergencies do not really matter. That is wrong too.
Security needs may well matter, playing a major role in determining just where
the proper constitutional balance lies.
Id. Thus, Justice Breyer stressed a balanced view of constitutional protections and the
importance of protecting national security. See id.
10. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10 ("Judicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.").
11. See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State-secrets and Executive Power,
120 POL. SC. Q. 85, 102 (2005) ("In only four cases did courts ultimately reject the
government's assertion of the privilege."). Further, Weaver and Pallitto point out that of
the four cases, two, namely Republic Steel v. United States and U.S. Steel v. United States,
were blatant misapplications of the privilege in cases involving unclassified information
from the Department of Commerce. Id. In the third case, Yang v. Reno, Weaver and
Pallitto note that although the privilege was initially rejected, the court indicated that if
the government corrected procedural mistakes, the privilege would ultimately be upheld.
Id. Finally, the authors mention that in the fourth case, Halpern v. United States, the court
used a novel approach, ordering that the trial proceed in secret. Id.
12. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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Edmonds v. United States Department of Justice3 and Arar v. Ashcroft,"
to illustrate the difficulty that occurs when invocation of the state-secrets
privilege causes dismissal of a case, particularly at the pleadings stage.
The Comment reviews existing suggestions on how to prevent abuse of
the state-secrets privilege. The Comment concludes with a proposal for a
new Federal Rule of Evidence on the proper use of the state-secrets
privilege.
I. THE ORIGINS AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE-SECRETS
PRIVILEGE
A. Origins of the State-Secrets Privilege
The state-secrets privilege developed at common law.'5  The
foundation of the state-secrets privilege in the United States can be
traced as far back as 1807 in the treason trial of United States v. Burr.16 In
Burr, the defendant demanded access to a letter written by General
Wilkinson to President Thomas Jefferson, a key government witness.
7
The letter allegedly contained information regarding Burr's guilt, and,
according to Burr, was critical to his defense. 19 The government refused
to produce the letter because "[it might contain state-secrets, which
could not be divulged without endangering the national safety."20
Ultimately, the court did not have to answer the state-secrets issue,2' but
stated in dictum that if the letter contained information that "would be
imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the executive to
13. 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004), affd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8116 (D.C. Cir.
May 6, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
14. No. CV-04-0249 DGT VVP, 2006 WL 346439 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2006).
15. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-8; Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 70-73 (discussing
the early development of the state-secrets privilege); Matthew Silverman, Comment,
National Security and the First Amendment: A Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access
to Information, 78 IND. L.J. 1101, 1103-04 (2003) (discussing the origins of the state-secrets
privilege at common law); Note, The Military and State-secrets Privilege: Protection for the
National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 570-73 (1982).
16. 25 F. Cas. 30, 32, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D).
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 32. The letter "purportedly contained information 'in relation to the
transactions of Mr. Burr, "of whose guilt" [General Wilkinson] says, "there can be no
doubt .... Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting Burr, No.
14,692D, 25 F. Cas. at 32).
19. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 31.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 37. The court skirted the issue of suppression in this case because there was
"nothing before the court which show[ed] that the letter in question contain[ed] any
matter the disclosure of which would endanger the public safety." Id.
2006]
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disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable
to the point, [would], of course, be suppressed."22
In 1875, the Supreme Court confronted the state-secrets privilege issue
in Totten v. United States.23 In Totten, the plaintiff sought compensation
24from the government for work he performed as a wartime spy. The
Court formally recognized that public policy forbade a case to proceed
where the trial "would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which
the law itself regards as confidential."" Based on the plaintiff's wartime
duties, the Court reasoned that
[b]oth employer and agent must have understood that the lips
of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of
either to the matter. This condition of the engagement was
implied from the nature of the employment, and is implied in all
secret employments of the government in time of war, or upon
matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the
service might compromise or embarrass our government in its
public duties, or endanger the person or injure the character of
the agent.
26
As a result of this reasoning, the Court upheld the dismissal of the27
case. Even though the term "state-secrets privilege" was never used inTotten, the case fortified the foundation for the privilege.2 8
B. United States v. Reynolds: Modern Development of the State-Secrets
Privilege
Although the state-secrets privilege took root as early as 1807, United
States v. Reynolds, 9 decided in 1953, is the privilege's defining case. ° In
22. Id.
23. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
24. Id. at 105-06. The plaintiff "was to proceed South and ascertain the number of
troops stationed at different points in the insurrectionary States, procure plans of forts and
fortifications, and gain such other information as might be beneficial to the government of
the United States, and report the facts to the President." Id.
25. Id. at 107.
26. Id. at 106. The Court further reasoned that
[i]f upon contracts of such a nature an action against the government could be
maintained in the Court of Claims, whenever an agent should deem himself
entitled to greater or different compensation than that awarded to him, the
whole service in any case, and the manner of its discharge, with the details of
dealings with individuals and officers, might be exposed, to the serious detriment
of the public.
Id. at 106-07; see also Kelly D. Wheaton, Spycraft and Government Contracts: A Defense
of Totten v. United States, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1997, at 9, 16-17 (discussing the importance
of the Totten doctrine in the government's ability to carry out covert operations).
27. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
28. Id. at 106-07.
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Reynolds, widows brought a suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for the wrongful deaths of their husbands, who
were on board a B-29 military aircraft that crashed while the crew was
performing a highly secret mission involving electronic equipment.31 The
widows sought production of the Air Force's official accident report and
statements taken from surviving persons.32 The government refused to
supply the report, stating that it could not do so "'without seriously
hampering national security, flying safety and the development of highly
technical and secret military equipment."'
In its analysis, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that "the
privilege against revealing military secrets ... is well established in the
law of evidence. 3 4  In a few short sentences, the Court laid out the
guidelines for invocation of the state-secrets privilege. The Court began
by explaining that the privilege "belongs to the Government and must be
asserted by it,,3 6 but urged that "[i]t is not to be lightly invoked. 3 7 The
Court explained that "[t]here must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer."3"
Of critical importance, the Court established the judiciary as the final
check on the use of the privilege when it stated that "[t]he court itself
must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim
of privilege."39  The Court recognized that making the judiciary a
safeguard on the executive use of the privilege created a circular
problem. 40 The Court wanted the judiciary to be a final check on this
29. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
30. Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
745, 750-52 (1991); Silverman, supra note 15, at 1104-05; Note, supra note 15, at 571-73;
Brian M. Tomney, Case Note, Contemplating the Use of Classified or State Secret
Information Obtained Ex Parte on the Merits in Civil Litigation: Bl(a)ck Tea Society v.
City of Boston, 57 ME. L. REV. 641, 647-48 (2005); see also Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2004) (providing thorough historical discussion
of the state-secrets privilege), affd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8116 (D.C. Cir., May 6, 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
31. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 4-5 (quoting the Affidavit of a Judge Advocate General).
34. Id. at 6-7. To support how well-established the privilege was, the Court cited five
cases, including Totten, two evidence hornbooks, and a law review article. Id. at 7 n.11.
35. Id. at 7-8.
36. Id. at 7. The court further explained that "[it can neither be claimed nor waived
by a private party." Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 8.
40. See id.
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enormous power, but had to do so "without forcing a disclosure of the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.",4' Thus, the Court created
a "formula of compromise," whereby the judiciary had control, but could
not automatically require complete disclosure to evaluate the merits of a• 42
state-secrets privilege claim. The Court created a hypothesis where
even a "judge alone, in chambers" would not be permitted to see certain
state-secrets if there was reasonable danger that doing so would
jeopardize security. 43
Applying this "formula of compromise" to the facts of the case, the
Court overruled both the trial and appellate courts, 44 holding that the
Secretary of the Air Force did not need to submit the accident report or
statements.45  Through this, holding, Reynolds more clearly defined the
contours of the state-secrets privilege.
C. The Effect of the State-Secrets Privilege
Case law developed since Reynolds states that invocation of the state-
secrets privilege can have three effects. 46 First, the state-secrets privilege
can block production of potential evidence.47 Blocking production of
potential evidence can, in turn, have two effects. The plaintiff may be
41. Id. The Court then compared the state-secrets privilege to the privilege against
self-incrimination: "The privilege against self-incrimination presented the courts with a
similar sort of problem. Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force
disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a complete abandonment
of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses." Id.
42. Id. at 9-10. The Court declared that "[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers." Id. However, the Court was not
willing to "go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case." Id. at
10.
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 11-12.
45. Id. at 10-11. "Certainly there was a reasonable danger that the accident
investigation report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment which
was the primary concern of the mission." Id. at 10. In coming to this decision, the Court
also used necessity as a factor to determine whether the privilege should be invoked. Id.
at 11. However, "even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." Id.
46. See, e.g., Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 78 (D.D.C. 2004),
affd, U.S. App. LEXIS 8116 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
The court stated that "[i]t is generally understood that 'the application of the state-secrets
privilege can ... have three effects."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Tenet,
329 F.3d 1135, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also, Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166-67
(9th Cir. 1998) (describing the three effects of invocation of the state-secrets privilege).
47. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166-67. The accident report in Reynolds is a prime example
of the removal of a piece of evidence from a case due to the state-secrets privilege, but the
case proceeding in the absence of such evidence. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
[Vol. 55:831
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S 48able to proceed without the requested discovery. However, if the
requested discovery is critical to the plaintiff's case, then the inability to
introduce the privileged evidence will prevent the plaintiff from
presenting a prima facie case.49 Similarly, a judge may dismiss a case if
the government is unable to defend itself without using the classified
privileged information. 50
The second application of the state-secrets privilege occurs when the
government is prosecuting and a defendant is deprived of information
necessary to a valid defense.51 In this case, summary judgment in favor ofS 52
the defendant is appropriate.
Finally, invocation of the state-secrets privilege may lead to dismissal
of the entire case even if the plaintiff is able to prosecute a claim using
only non-privileged evidence.53 For example, a court reasoned that "if
'the very subject matter of the action' is a state secret, then the court
should dismiss the plaintiff's action based solely on the invocation of the
state-secrets privilege. 5 4  Such dismissal may occur at the pleadings
stage, prior to discovery." One court described this effect as "harsh," but
determined that "the results are harsh in either direction and the state-
secrets doctrine finds the greater public good. 56 Thus, the court felt
dismissal of a plaintiff's claim, even when the claim is valid, is "ultimately
the less harsh remedy.,
57
D. Use of the State-Secrets Privilege to Dismiss an Entire Case
Reynolds, the major state-secrets privilege case, never explicitly
explored the three possible effects of the privilege.58 Therefore, a review
48. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (explaining that "by invoking the privilege over
particular evidence, the evidence is completely removed from the case. The plaintiff's
case then goes forward based on evidence not covered by the privilege." (citing Reynolds,
345 U.S. at 11)).
49. See id. at 1166 ("[i]f, after further proceedings, the plaintiff cannot prove the
prima facie elements of her claim with nonprivileged evidence, then the court may dismiss
her claim as it would with any plaintiff who cannot prove her case.").
50. See Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (citing Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991)).
51. See, e.g., Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (citing Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973
F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992)).
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
54. Id. (quoting Reyonlds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
55. See, e.g., Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 814-15 (9th Cir.
1989); Guong v. United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1064-65, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Edmonds,
323 F. Supp. 2d at 68, 81-82; Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 757 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
56. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144.
57. Id.
58. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1.
2006]
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of decisions justifying dismissal of an entire case at the pleadings stage
affords useful insight. In the 2004 Edmonds decision, the court
specifically considered the three possible applications of the state-secret
privilege."6 In doing so, the court quoted Kasza v. Browner6° as
precedent. In Kasza, the court relied on language in Reynolds to hold
that the state-secrets privilege can justify dismissal of an entire case at
the pleadings stage.6' However, the Reynolds Court never explicitly
evaluated the three evolved and expanded applications of the privilege 3
The Kasza court drew upon various parts of the Reynolds decision to
find support for the three applications of the privilege. 64 Specifically, the
Kasza court based its conclusion that the state-secrets privilege can be
used to dismiss an entire case at the pleadings stage on the Reynolds
discussion of the relative importance of the litigant's need for discovery.
65
The Reynolds Court stated that even though the state-secrets privilege
"should not be lightly accepted .... even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that the military secrets are at stake., 66 In support of its reasoning, the
Reynolds Court cited the 1875 Totten decision.6' Like Reynolds, the
Totten holding resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiff's case at the
pleadings stage.68 According to Reynolds, the Totten Court reached this
conclusion because "the very subject matter of the action, a contract to
perform espionage, was a matter of state secret., 69  Totten found, in
70effect, that a contract to perform espionage is a state secret per se.
Great care must be used before applying the privilege broadly because
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty," to be protected by the laws in court,7'
is effectively denied as a result of invocation of the state-secrets privilege.
Recent use of the state-secrets privilege suggests movement away from
59. Edmonds v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 78 (D.D.C. 2004), affd,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8116 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
The court stated that "[it is generally understood that '[t]he application of the state-
secrets privilege can ... have three effects."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Doe v.
Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003)).
60. 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).
61. See Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
62. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
63. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1.
64. See Kazsa, 133 F.3d at 1166 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 & n.26).
65. See id.
66. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
67. Id. at 11 n.26 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27,
69. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26 (citing Totten, 92 U.S. 105).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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narrow use of the state-secrets privilege into more expansive and
potentially harmful applications.
1. The Trend Toward Expansive Use of the State-Secrets Privilege
Moves Away From the Notion that the Privilege Is "Not To Be Lightly
Invoked"
The more recent, broader application of the state-secrets privilege
strongly suggests a movement away from one of the key principles
enunciated in Reynolds-the state-secrets privilege is "not to be lightly
invoked."72
The use of the state-secrets privilege has expanded in two ways: (1) the
absolute number of cases involving invocation of the state-secrets
privilege by the government has increased; 73 and (2) within the increased
number of state-secrets privilege cases, a larger percentage of those cases
involve dismissal of the entire case due to the claimed sensitive nature of
the case.74 This recent expanded use of the privilege lies in contrast with
72. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
73. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 101. Between 1953, the year of the Reynolds
decision, and 1976, the election year of Jimmy Carter, "there were four reported cases in
which the government invoked the privilege. Between 1977 and 2001, there were a total
of fifty-one reported cases in which courts ruled on invocation of the privilege." Id. While
the authors did not cite the fifty-one cases, individual research on the issue yields
approximately the same number of cases. See OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, SECRECY
REPORT CARD 2005: QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF SECRECY IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 2 (2005), http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2005_embargoed.
pdf ("The executive branch is using the 'state secrecy' privilege 33 times more often than
during the height of the Cold War.").
74. See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 1237-38 (2005) (dismissing case at
pleadings stage in case involving the attempt to enforce a contract for alleged espionage);
Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Sterling v. Goss, No.
05-571, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 87 (Jan. 9, 2006) (affirming dismissal of case at pleadings stage
where a covert agent sued the Director of the CIA for alleged racial discrimination);
Trulock v. Lee, 66 Fed. App'x 472, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding dismissal of complaint
where former Department of Energy (DOE) employee brought action against the DOE
for alleged defamation); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 1995)
(affirming dismissal of case at pleadings stage in case where plaintiff alleged that the
government subjected him to harassment and psychological attacks); Bowles v. United
States, 950 F.2d 154, 155 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal of United States as party in
case where plaintiff was hurt in car accident where car was owned by the government and
operated by a government employee); In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1286-88 (4th Cir.
1991) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant after minimal discovery in case
where a former government contractor sued various government agencies for allegedly
preventing the plaintiff's contract from being renewed); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 545 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing case at pleadings stage where estate of
sailor sued designers and manufacturers of missile defense system which allegedly
malfunctioned); Weston v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 815-16 (9th Cir.
1989) (issuing a dismissal at the pleadings stage where homosexual man sued the
Department and Secretary of Defense for allegedly denying him a security clearance
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the cases following Reynolds, which applied the state-secrets privilege
narrowly to block only specified requested discovery, and, importantly,
permitted the case to continue.75 The increased use of the state-secrets
based on his sexual preference); Guong v. United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1064, 1067 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of case at pleadings stage where plaintiff, an alleged
Vietnam spy, tried to enforce an espionage contract with the United States in a case
similar to Totten); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985)
(upholding dismissal of case because very nature of question in this libel suit was itself a
state secret); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (holding, over a strong dissent, that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie
case due to the sensitive nature of the case); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004), aftd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8116 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005) (dismissing case at pleadings stage where former FBI
employee alleged that FBI unchecked security breaches disclosed her personal employee
folder to unauthorized persons in violation of the Privacy Act); Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F.
Supp. 2d 623, 624, 626-27 (E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing case at pleadings where CIA
employee brought suit against the Director of the CIA for alleged gender discrimination);
Mounsey v. Allied-Signal, Inc., No. CV95-4309SVW(MCX), 2000 WL 34017116, (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 10, 2000) (granting summary judgment at pleadings stage in case involving
"friendly-fire" of U.S. Black Hawk helicopters); Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 1459, 1462,
1468 (D. Nev. 1996) (dismissing case at pleadings where persons brought suit against the
United States Air Force under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Bentzlin v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1487 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing at the pleadings
stage a case involving alleged malfunction of U.S. military missile aircraft which killed
U.S. Marines during the Persian Gulf War); Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 101, 102-
03, 105 (D. Conn. 1991) (dismissing case after minimal discovery where court held that the
subject matter of the case, the patent on an invention of a cryptographic encoding device,
turned on a state secret); Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 754, 756 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (dismissing the case at the pleadings where family members of passengers who died
on an Iranian aircraft after it was shot down by U.S. missiles sued).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1953); Northrop Corp. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding privilege related to
state-secrets, but saying it was premature to grant privilege for documents that had not
been used by the Departments of Defense and State to determine applicability of state-
secrets); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding privilege for
documents describing electronic surveillance of the plaintiffs, but refusing to uphold
privilege used to hide the identities of the Attorneys General who authorized the wiretaps
in case where plaintiffs alleged warrantless electronic surveillance); Halpern v. United
States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958) (denying government's request for dismissal of case
at the pleadings stage and ordering a trial in camera); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United
States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 159, 162 (Cl. Ct. 1983) (upholding privilege in patent infringement
case but encouraging counsel to proceed with discovery); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 101 F.R.D. 97, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (ordering that the government provide
more in camera information to determine if more information should be provided to
determine whether certain people were alive); Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United
States, 557 F. Supp. 593, 594, 596 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (permitting limited discovery to
determine whether motion for state-secrets privilege was proper in case where the
government sought to block discovery of documents given to it by the Mexican
government); Nat'l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (requiring strict adherence to procedure in order to uphold privilege); Sigler v.
LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 188-89, 198-99 (D. Md. 1980) (upholding the privilege when
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privilege suggests a gradual judicial acceptance of a broadened state-
secrets privilege, departing from the principles announced in Reynolds.76
2. The Analytical Distinction Between the Totten Per Se Rule and the
State-Secrets Privilege
In its 2005 decision in Tenet v. Doe,77 the Supreme Court made an
instructive distinction between the state-secrets privilege and what it
called the "Totten rule," referring to the 1875 Totten holding. 78 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that the state-secrets privilege has its roots
in Totten.79 The Totten rule prohibits any trial "'which would inevitably
lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential.' 80 Thus, the effect of the Totten rule is to dismiss the entire
case when it would involve such disclosures. The state-secrets privilege,
widow and daughter of Army spy agent who died after severe Army questioning
demanded documents, but permitting case to proceed until the court believed that
litigation would lead to impermissible disclosure); In re Franklin Nat. Bank Sec. Litig., 478
F. Supp. 577, 581, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that purely factual documents themselves
in complex securities litigation were not privileged, but summaries and analysis of the
reports were privileged); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(allowing case to continue where some documents regarding Air Force policy, opinions,
speculations, or recommendations were held not privileged, but others related to state-
secrets were held privileged). But see, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 999 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (holding that the state-secrets privilege was properly used, thereby causing the
plaintiffs to lose their standing in court); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8, 11 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding that privilege should be upheld, thereby blocking discovery regarding two
types of government spy techniques).
76. See Shannon Vibbert, Comment, A Twisted Mosaic: The Ninth Circuit's Piecemeal
Approval of Environmental Crime in Kasza v. Browner, 17 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 95, 103-04, 106-07 (2003).
77. 125 S. Ct. 1230 (2005).
78. Id. at 1236-38; see also Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy,
No. CV-86-3292, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19034, at *5-9 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 1989). In Tenet,
the Supreme Court held that two former Cold War spies could not file suit against the
Government. Tenet, 125 S. Ct. at 1233. The spies conducted espionage against their
native country on behalf of the United States, in exchange for ensured financial and
personal security within the United States. Id. When the spies felt that the U.S.
government was not meeting its obligations, they brought suit. Id. The Court ultimately
dismissed the case. Id.
79. See Tenet, 125 S. Ct. at 1236 ("When invoking the 'well established' state-secrets
privilege, we indeed looked to Totten.").
80. Id. (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)). In Tenet, the Court
"preclude[d] judicial review in cases such as respondents' where success depends upon the
existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government." Id. Indeed, the
facts regarding the enforcement of an espionage agreement in Tenet are parallel to the
facts in the Totten case, almost 130 years prior. Compare Totten, 92 U.S. at 105-06, with
Tenet, 125 S. Ct. at 1233-34.
81. See Tenet, 125 S. Ct. at 1233 (noting that the Ninth Circuit in Tenet erred when it
held that Totten did not require a dismissal).
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on the other hand, "simply cannot provide the absolute protection we
found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule. 82  In making this
distinction, the Court insinuated that the state-secrets privilege is merely
an evidentiary tool, without the absolute preclusive effect of the per se
rule in the Totten decision.83 Thus, the Tenet holding suggests that where
courts are using the state-secrets privilege to dismiss a case at the
pleadings stage, as opposed to blocking discovery that in effect prevents
a plaintiff from stating a claim, they should have done so under the
Totten rule instead of the state-secrets privilege.84 The Court reaffirmed
that both the Totten rule and the state-secrets privilege are narrow tools.
Where the Totten rule should be used narrowly in intrinsic state secret
cases such as where plaintiffs seek to enforce contracts involving
espionage,"' the Tenet holding suggests that the state-secrets privilege
should only be used as an evidentiary tool to fence privileged material
rather than dismiss a case entirely."6 The Totten rule should only be
applied, especially at the pleadings stage, where the subject matter of the
claim is, per se, a state secret.87
Tenet's careful distinction indicates the Court was sending a cautionary
message against misapplication of the broad sanction provided by Totten
for per se security cases to actions where only some of the evidence
18
requires privileged protection. 8
3. Excessive Use of the State-Secrets Privilege and the Government's
Use of its Classification Powers Create Significant Public Policy
Concerns
Professor Thomas Emerson, a First Amendment scholar, noted that
"[t]he secrecy attached to many national security issues allows the
government to invoke national security claims in order to cover up
embarrassment, incompetence, corruption or outright violation of law.
And subsequent events almost always demonstrate that the asserted
dangers to national security have been grossly exaggerated. '" 89 Despite
82. Id. at 1237.
83. See id. ("There is, in short, no basis for respondents' and the Court of Appeals'
view that the Totten bar has been reduced to an example of the state-secrets privilege.").
84. See id. at 1235 n.4, 1236-38.
85. See supra note 80.
86. See Tenet, 125 S. C. at 1237-38.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1238.
89. Askin, supra note 30, at 760 (quoting Thomas Emerson, National Security and
Civil Liberties, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 84-85 (1984)).
Recognizing this issue, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,958 in 1995, which
declares that "[i]n no case shall information be classified in order to (1) conceal violations
of law, inefficiency, or administrative error [or] (2) prevent embarrassment to a person,
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concerns regarding too much secrecy, the Government has significantly
increased the amount of documents that are considered classified in
recent years, especially since September 11, 2001.90 As a potentially
organization, or agency." Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,829 (Apr. 17
1995). As an example of overclassification in United States history, a recent article in the
New York Times discussed how the "National Security Agency has kept secret since 2001
a finding by an agency historian that during the Tonkin Gulf episode, which helped
precipitate the Vietnam War, N.S.A. officers deliberately distorted critical intelligence to
cover up their mistakes." Scott Shane, Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2005, at Al.
90. See Emerging Threats: Overclassification and Psuedo-classification: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on National Security, Emergency Threats and International Relations
of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 120 (2005) (prepared statement of
Thomas Blanton, Executive Director, National Security Archive), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/20922.pdf. Mr. Blanton of the
National Security Archive addressed the chairman's question "whether overclassification
was a 10% problem or a 90% problem." Id. Mr. Blanton argued that overclassification
was a problem "towards the high end" of the range. Id. at 121. He noted:
The deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security
confessed that 50% of the Pentagon's information was overclassified. The head
of the Information Security Oversight Office said it was even worse, "even
beyond 50%." The former official who participated in the Markle Foundation
study cited by the 9/11 Commission on information sharing stated that 80-90%
(at least in the area of intelligence and technology) was appropriately classified
at first, but over time that dwindled down to the 10-20% range.
Id. at 120 (emphasis omitted). Mr. Blanton further cited the former Solicitor General of
the United States, Erwin Griswold, who prosecuted a case often referred to as the
Pentagon Papers Case. Id. at 121. Griswold stated:
"It quickly becomes apparent to any person who has considerable experience
with classified material that there is massive overclassification and that the
principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but with
governmental embarrassment of one sort or another. There may be some basis
for short-term classification while plans are being made, or negotiations are
going on, but apart from details of weapons systems, there is very rarely any real
risk to current national security from the publication of facts relating to
transactions in the past, even the fairly recent past."
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Erwin N. Griswold, Editorial, Secrets Not Worth Keeping:
The Courts and Classified Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25); see also
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 108. Weaver and Pallitto discussed that while former
Attorney General Janet Reno authorized withholding of information under a request
based on the Freedom of Information Act only if an agency "'reasonably foresees that
disclosure would be harmful [to national security],"' id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Janet Reno, Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies: Subject: The
Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993)), the subsequent Attorney General, John
Ashcroft "directs agencies to withhold information where there is a 'sound legal basis' to
do so," id. (quoting John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments
and Agencies: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001). Thus, this is another
example of how the government has broadened the criteria for holding documents secret
or confidential.
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problematic number of documents become classified, 9 it is more likely
that the Government can assert the state-secrets privilege based on a
document which is unnecessarily or improperly classified. 92
Some argue that this concern was justified in a compelling manner in
the state-secrets privilege arena. 93 Fifty years after the Reynolds decision,
the accident report that the Government demanded be kept secret in that
case was declassified. 94 Because the accident involved a military plane
that tested secret equipment,95 the obvious assumption was that the
Government was concerned that the report would reveal sensitive
information regarding the secret military equi pment. 96  However,
disclosure of the accident report many years later revealed that it did not
discuss any secret electronic or military equipment. Instead, the report
discussed the role of the military's negligence in the crash.98 Specifically,
the "report state[d] that 'engine failure caused the crash' and that the
91. See supra note 90; see also OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, supra note 73, at 1.
The OpenTheGovernment.org report stated that "[It]he government decided to stamp
documents secret a record 15.6 million times in 2004. The U.S. government last year alone
spent $7.2 billion securing its classified information. That's more than any annual cost in
at least a decade." Id. The report also stated that "[flor every $1 the federal government
spent in 2004 releasing old secrets, it spent an extraordinary $148 creating new secrets.
That's a $28 jump from 2003. In contrast, from 1997 to 2001, the government spent less
than $20 per year keeping secrets for every dollar spent declassifying them." Id.
92. See supra note 91. One commentary argued that given the potential breadth of
the state-secrets privilege, Attorney General John Ashcroft's directive regarding a request
based on the Freedom of Information Act is "tantamount to making disclosure of any
particular piece of information subject to the idiosyncratic discretion of administrators."
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 108. The authors further stated that "[a] 'sound legal
basis' for withholding information under the state-secrets privilege may be manufactured
for virtually any document an administrator does not want the public to see." Id.
93. See Robyn E. Blumner, The Dangers of Keeping Secrets, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 28,2005, at 4P.
94. See Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at *7-8
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), affd, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005). In this case, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided whether the Reynolds case
should be reopened based on the declassification of the accident report. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 31.
96. See Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *6. The court stated that "[p]laintiffs deduce
that only the mission and electronic equipment were confidential." Id.; see also United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953). Reynolds cited an affidavit of the Judge Advocate
General, United States Air Force, "which asserted that the demanded material could not
be furnished 'without seriously hampering national security, flying safety and the
development of highly technical and secret military equipment."' Id.
97. See Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *8 (discussing the declassification of the
Reynolds accident report); Blumner, supra note 93.
98. See Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *8; Blumner, supra note 93.
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accident might have been avoided 'had the plane complied with the
technical orders." ' 99
Based on the newly declassified documents, the Reynolds plaintiffs
unsuccessfully tried to reopen the fifty-year-old case under the stringent
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).1°° The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that under Rule
60(b)(3), 1 the plaintiffs failed to make the necessary showing of a fraud
on the court.' °2 The court supported its reasoning with three main
arguments.103 First, the court relied on what has been referred to as the
"mosaic theory."' ° In essence, the court said that even if the accident
report alone did not constitute a state secret, it could be pieced together
with other seemingly innocent information and thereby create
information which would pose a reasonable danger'05 Second, the court
broadly read the affidavits provided in support of the Government's
99. Blumner, supra note 93; see also Morning Edition: Administration Employing
State-secrets Privilege at Quick Clip (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 9, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4838701). The reporter
interviewed the daughter of one of the men killed in the crash. Id. She stated that the
accident report described a series of crew and maintenance errors. Id. The problems
began when an engine on the plane went on fire. Id. A pilot attempted to "feather" the
engine, meaning turn the engine off. Id. However, the pilot accidentally turned off the
wrong engine. Id. By the time the plane crashed, three out of four of the engines had
failed. Id.
100. Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *9-10.
101. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states: "On motion and upon such terms as
are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud . . .
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party .... FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
102. See Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *4-11.
103. See id.
104. See id. at *5; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 103-05. The court stated that
"because 'each individual piece of intelligence information, like a piece of [a] jigsaw
puzzle, may aid in piecing together bits of information even when the individual piece is
not of obvious importance itself."' Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *5 (alteration in
original) (quoting Fitzgibbons v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Thus, the court
should defer to the Government's claim of privilege even for "'information that standing
alone may seem harmless, but that together with other information poses a reasonable
danger of divulging too much to a "sophisticated intelligence analyst .... Id. (quoting In re
United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
105. Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *5; see also Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at
103-05. Weaver and Pallitto described the mosaic theory as holding that "even
unclassified, seemingly banal information may be protected by the privilege because the
sum of a larger number of unclassified disclosures may add up to an overall picture of
classified operations and capabilities." Id. at 104. The authors concluded that the mosaic
theory "may now prevent disclosure of unclassified information that cannot in any sense
be reasonably characterized as state-secrets. This is a rather stunning reach for a privilege
that started out as a device to protect only the most sensitive information." Id.
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claim of privilege in Reynolds. °6 The first affidavit was of Secretary of
the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, which stated in relevant part:
"the aircraft in question, together with the personnel on board,
were engaged in a confidential mission of the Air Force. The
airplane likewise carried confidential equipment on board and
any disclosure of its mission or information concerning its
operation or performance would be prejudicial to this
Department and would not be in the public interest.',
10 7
Although the affidavit refers mostly to confidential equipment and
mission, the court demanded that this be read broadly so it "suggests that
beyond the mission itself, disclosure of technical details of the B-29
bomber, its operation, or performance would also compromise national
security. ' '  Similarly, the court stated that a second affidavit by Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force, Major General Reginald C.
Harmon, should also be read as to suggest the existence of secrets
beyond the particulars of the affidavit.' ° General Harmon's affidavit
stated that revealing the accident report would hurt "'national security,
flying safety and the development of highly technical and secret military
equipment."'' .0 Lastly, the court stated that even if the accident report
did not discuss secret military missions or equipment, it could still
constitute a military secret."' The court acknowledged that the accident
report concluded that engine failure caused the crash and if the plane
had complied with orders, it likely would not have crashed. 2 The court
recognized that the report did not "refer to any newly developed
electronic devices or secret electronic equipment.",1 3 However, the court
tried to stress that because the Reynolds decision was made "amid
Communist paranoia, it is hardly shocking to contemplate an Air Force
eager to protect from public view the accident investigation report that
mentions modifications needed for the [military planes]."" 4 Similarly,
the court refused to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6), which "permits an independent action for fraud
perpetrated by one party upon another where necessary 'to prevent a
106. Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *6.
107. Id. (quoting Complaint 14, Exhibit C).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Complaint 1 15, Exhibit D).
111. Id. at *6-7.
112. Id. at *8.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *9. In support of this point, the court described how three American
bomber planes were forced to land in the then-Soviet Union in 1944. Id. at *8. The
Soviets used the planes to learn how to build their own planes, which were ultimately used
by the Soviets to detonate an atomic bomb in 1949. Id.
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grave miscarriage of justice.'.. 5 In its analysis, the court focused on the
importance of finality in the judicial system.116
Although the court held that the accident report in Reynolds was not
classified in such a way to constitute a fraud under the stringent standard
of Rule 60(b), "7 it does not necessarily follow that the report should have
been classified. It is at least possible that the Government overclassified
the report "amid Communist paranoia." 8 In any event, this case is not
unique, and overclassification today seems to be growing," 9 thereby
increasing the likelihood that invocation of the state-secrets privilege will
be based on an improperly classified document. 120
E. Recent Cases Dismissed as a Result of Invocation of the State-Secrets
Privilege: Edmonds v. United States Department of Justice and Arar v.
Ashcroft
Two recent cases illustrate the frustration caused by the dismissal of
presumptively valid claims because of the state-secrets privilege when the
subject matter of the litigation is deemed sensitive: 1 1) Edmonds v.
United States Department of Justice'
2 and 2) Arar v. Ashcroft.1
23
The FBI hired Sibel Edmonds as a translator soon after the attacks of
September 11, 2001.124 Ms. Edmonds contended that she witnessed
serious security breaches during her time at the FBI.12 ' Her primary
115. Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1998)).
116. See id. at *9-10.
117. See id. at *8.
118. Id. at *9. Despite the court's reluctance to reopen a fifty-year-old case that had
eventually settled, the court acknowledged that the report never referred "to any newly
developed electronic devices or secret electronic equipment." Id. at *8.
119. See supra note 90; see also Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 87-88. Weaver
and Pallitto stated that "[vlirtually all observers acknowledge that overclassification is a
significant problem, and this has led to some embarrassing moments for the executive
branch." Id. at 87. One of the several examples that the authors cite is related to the
infamous Pentagon Papers. Id. There, the executive branch "reasserted classification of
the Pentagon Papers after the papers had already been published in The New York
Times." Id.
120. See supra text accompanying note 90.
121. See Scott M. Palatucci, Note, The Effectiveness of Citizen Suits in Preventing the
Environment from Becoming a Casualty of War, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 585, 598-603 (2004).
Palatucci expresses frustration with two cases, Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Nev.
1996), and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998), that involved serious
environmental grievances which were dismissed as a result of the state-secrets privilege.
Palatucci, supra, at 598-603.
122. 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81 (D.D.C. 2004), affd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8116 (D.C.
Cir. May 6, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. (2005).
123. No. CV-04-0249 DGT VVP, 2006 WL 346439 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2006).
124. Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
125. Id. at 68 n.4.
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complaint alleged potential espionage within the agency.126  Her
complaints were substantiated by a report authored by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) which "found that many of Edmonds' core allegations
[regarding espionage within the FBI] were supported by either
documentary evidence or witnesses other than Edmonds.', 2 7 Yet, instead
of the FBI commending Ms. Edmonds for whistle-blowing, they fired
her.
128
Armed with the DOJ report, Ms. Edmonds brought a suit against the
United States Government.2 The lawsuit proffered three theories of
liability. 130  The first stated that under the Privacy Act, defendants
unlawfully released information about the plaintiff. 3' The second argued
that the First Amendment should protect Ms. Edmonds against what she
believed was a retaliatory termination. The third urged that Ms.
Edmonds' termination violated her Fifth Amendment right to procedural
and substantive due process."'
Without addressing any of Ms. Edmonds' allegations, the government
moved to dismiss the entire case, prior to discovery, based on the state-
secrets privilege.3 4  The defendants stated that the issue was whether
litigation of the subject matter would threaten national security.135 As aresult, "the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations" -no matter how
126. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW
OF THE FBI's ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY CONTRACT
LINGUIST SIBEL EDMONDS § IV (2005), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
oig/sedmonds.html. ("In the classified version of the report, we fully described and
evaluated the evidence underlying nearly a dozen separate allegations Edmonds made
regarding the co-worker which, when viewed together, amounted to an accusation against
the co-worker of possible espionage.").
127. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 126, § IV. The report stated that
"had the FBI performed a more careful investigation of Edmonds' allegations, it would
have discovered evidence of significant omissions and inaccuracies by the co-worker
related to these allegations." Id.
128. Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 69; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra
note 126, § I.
129. Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 67-68.
130. Id. at 70.
131. Id. The complaint stated that Ms. Edmonds' confidential information, including
"'information that Plaintiff was subject to a security review, [and information about the]
Plaintiff's job performance and other information contained in the Defendants' personnel,




134. See Defendants' Reply in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1-2 & n.1,
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (C.A. No. 1:02CV01448(JR)).
135. See id. at 2.
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alarming-are irrelevant.1 16 The trial court granted the motion, "albeit
with great consternation, in the interests of national security." '37
The second case, Arar v. Ashcroft,3 8 offers a more extreme illustration
of the application of the dismissal remedy at the pleadings stage upon
assertion of the state-secrets privilege. In this case, the plaintiff, Maher
Arar, a Syrian-born man and Canadian citizen, alleged that U.S. officials
seized him while he was in international transit through John F. Kennedy
airport (JFK) in New York, and sent to Syria, where he was tortured.39
The complaint specifically refers to a controversial covert operation
referred to as "extraordinary renditions," which involves "removing non-
U.S. citizens detained in this country and elsewhere and suspected-
reasonably or unreasonably-of terrorist activity to countries, including
Syria, where interrogations under torture are routine."'4  Mr. Arar stated
136. Id. The government explained "whether plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is irrelevant. Here, what is at issue is not the
sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations-but what proof of, defense against, or mere litigation
of them would entail." Id. (emphasis added).
137. Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82. The court supported this drastic result with
three reasons. Id. at 73-81. First, the case was personally reviewed by the U.S. Attorney
General who formally invoked the state-secrets privilege. Id. at 73-75. Second, the
specificity requirement was satisfied, although it could not be explained by the court for
fear of discussing matters harmful to national security. Id. at 75-77. Lastly, the court held
that the litigation could not proceed without disclosing privileged information. Id. at 77-
81. Thus, the entire case was dismissed, even though it appeared likely that Ms. Edmonds
had a strong case against the government. See Eric Lichtblau, Whistle-Blowing Said to be
Factor in an FBI Firing, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2004, at Al; Did FBI Deliberately Slow
Translation?, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 25, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/lO/
60minutes/main562685.shtml; FBI Whistleblower Claims Confirmed, CBSNEwS.COM, Jul.
29, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/29/eveningnews/main632983.shtml.
Despite Ms. Edmonds' potentially strong case, the lower court's decision was upheld and
the Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject
F.B.l. Translator's Appeal on Termination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A22.
138. No. CV-04-0249 DGT VVP, 2006 WL 346439 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2006).
139. Id. at *1-2.
140. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, Arar, 2006 WL 346439 (No. CV-04-
0249 DGT VVP); see also JIMMY CARTER, OUR ENDANGERED VALUES 128-29 (2005)
(stating that an estimated 150 prisoners have been subject to the renditions program and
highlighting Mr. Arar's case); Nina Bernstein, U.S. Defends Detentions at Airports, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at B1 (discussing Mr. Arar's case and the extraordinary renditions
practice); Douglas Jehi & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at I (discussing a post 9/11 rule which permits the CIA
to act without case by case approval on rendition cases and the renditions program
generally); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 106-07
(discussing extraordinary rendition program since the mid-1990s, its development, and
several alleged cases, including Mr. Arar's); Scott Shane et al., Detainee's Suit Gains
Support From Jet's Log, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005, at Al (discussing Mr. Arar's case and
the government's argument disputing that this is a case of rendition, but rather
deportation).
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that he had been on vacation with his family in Tunisia in late September
2002.14' During his vacation, he received an e-mail from his former
employer in Canada, MathWorks, where he had worked as an engineer,
asking him to come back to meet with a potential client.4 2 Mr. Arar
complied, leaving his wife and two children in Tunisia to continue their
vacation, and left for Zurich. 43 After stopping briefly in Zurich, he left
for Canada with a layover at JFK.' 44 When he stopped at JFK, Mr. Arar
presented his Canadian passport. 4  At that point, an immigration
inspector pulled Mr. Arar aside, fingerprinted and photographed him.'46
When he asked to see an attorney, Mr. Arar was allegedly told that "only
U.S. citizens were entitled to lawyers.' '147 While detained, an FBI agent
allegedly interrogated Mr. Arar for five hours, asking specific questions
regarding any relations with Mr. Abdullah Almalki. 4  Subsequently, an
immigration officer questioned him about any links to any terrorist
group. 49  Mr. Arar "vehemently denied any such membership or
affiliation."''50 Allegedly, he was "chained and shackled, put in a vehicle,
and driven to another building at JFK, where he was placed in solitary
confinement.' 151  The next evening, after further questioning, the
complaint alleged that an immigration officer asked him to "'volunteer'
to be sent to Syria.' 5 2 Mr. Arar refused and was later sent to a detention
center in Brooklyn where he was strip-searched. 53 For the next three
days, Mr. Arar stated that the Government did not permit him to use the
phone to call his family or an attorney. '14 At the end of the three days,
141. Arar, 2006 WL 346439, at *1.
142. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 140, at 10-11.





148. Id. at 11-12. A New York Times article which also recounted Mr. Arar's story
stated that Mr. Arar was seen walking with Mr. Almalki in the rain in Canada by a
Canadian surveillance team. Scott Shane, The Costs of Outsourcing Interrogation: A
Canadian Muslim's Long Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at 10. Although
neither the complaint nor the New York Times article explained why Mr. Almalki would
raise suspicion, the New York Times article alleged that Mr. Almalki was also later
detained in Syria and tortured. Id. In the article, Mr. Arar claimed that the two men were
not discussing terrorism, but rather if Mr. Almalki could get him a discount on ink
cartridges. Id.
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Mr. Arar was given a document declaring that the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) found him "inadmissible in the United
States because he belonged to .an organization designated by the
Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, namely, Al
Qaeda."'55 At this point, the United States permitted Mr. Arar to call his
family, who, in turn, called an attorney.156 Three days later, more
interrogations took place, late on Sunday, October 6, 2002, without Mr.
Arar's attorney present.5 7 The complaint alleged that INS falsely told
Mr. Arar's attorney of his whereabouts, and told the attorney to call back
the next day to find out Mr. Arar's current location. 5 8 On October 8,
2002, the Government informed Mr. Arar that he was being sent to Syria,
based on his acquaintances with certain people, including Mr. Almalki 9
Despite Mr. Arar's repeated concerns about torture, the officials
allegedly stated "that the INS is not governed by the 'Geneva
Convention. "" Purportedly, the Government sent Mr. Arar to a New
Jersey airfield, then flew him to Washington, D.C., then to Jordan, and
then ultimately to Syria. 6'
Although Mr. Arar's complaint stated that some beatings occurred in
Jordan, it primarily focused on the alleged gruesome torture during his
ten-month stay in Syria.6 2  According to Mr. Arar, Syrian officials
155. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 140, at 13.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 14. The complaint alleged that Mr. Arar's attorney was not told about the
interrogations until receiving a voicemail that Sunday evening from Defendant McElroy,
District Director for INS for New York City. Id. Unfortunately, Mr, Arar's attorney "did
not retrieve the message until she arrived at work the next day, Monday morning, October
7, 2002-long after Mr. Arar's interrogation had ended." Id.
158. Id. at 15. The complaint alleged that his attorney "received a call from an INS
official falsely notifying her that Mr. Arar had been taken to the INS's Varick Street
offices 'for processing' en route to a detention facility in New Jersey." Id. That same day,
she received a second phone call from the INS, "falsely notifying her that Mr. Arar had
arrived at the New Jersey detention facility" and to "call back the next day for the exact
location." Id. The complaint further alleged that Mr. Arar had remained at the same
detention facility that entire time. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. 15-16; see also Shane et al., supra note 140. The article reported that federal
aviation records corroborated Mr. Arar's account of where he flew during those days. Id.
The report explained that "It]he records show that a Gulfstream III jet, tail number
N829MG, followed a flight path matching the route he described." Id. This account
described a more detailed route within the United States before leaving, describing the
flight as "hopscotching from New Jersey to an airport near Washington to Maine to Rome
and beyond." Id.
162. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 140, at 16-19. Mr. Arar alleged
that he was detained by the Palestine Branch of Syrian Military Intelligence. Id. at 16.
There, Mr. Arar was purportedly subject to Syrian security who "regularly beat him on the
palms, hips, and lower back, using a two-inch thick electric cable. They also regularly
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released him after they were satisfied that he was not an Al Qaeda
member, almost twelve months after he was first detained.163 On January
22, 2004, Mr. Arar brought a suit against John Ashcroft, then Attorney
General of the United States, and other senior Government officials,
16
asserting four claims for relief.6 ' The government promptly responded
by asserting the state-secrets privilege.'6
In its recent February 16, 2006 decision, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York was able to dance around the
state-secrets privilege issue.167 Judge Trager, who decided the case, stated
"that before addressing the state-secrets privilege, it would be more
appropriate to resolve the motions to dismiss the statutory and
constitutional claims because it was not clear how the confidentiality of
struck Mr. Arar in the stomach, face, and back of the neck with their fists." Id. The
torture allegedly included psychological torture as well. Id. Mr. Arar's complaint stated
that the Syrian officers "placed him in a room where he could hear the screams of other
detainees being tortured. They also repeatedly threatened to place him in the spine-
breaking 'chair,' hang him upside down in a 'tyre' and beat him, and give him electric
shocks." Id. Mr. Arar stated that he confessed to training with terrorists only because he
wanted the torture to stop. Id.
163. Id. at 18-19; cf Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer
of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al (discussing the renditions program).
164. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 140. The complaint lists the
following as defendants:
JOHN ASHCROFT, [then] Attorney General of the United States; LARRY D.
THOMPSON, formerly Acting Deputy Attorney General; TOM RIDGE,
Secretary of State for Homeland Security; JAMES W. ZIGLAR, formerly
Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization Services; J. SCOTT
BLACKMAN, formerly Regional Director of the Eastern Regional Office of the
Immigration and Naturalization Services; PAULA CORRIGAN, Regional
Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; EDWARD J. MCELROY,
formerly District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Services for New
York District, and now District Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; ROBERT MUELLER, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and JOHN DOES 1-10, Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or
Immigration and Naturalization Service Agents.
Id. at 1.
165. Id. at 20-24. The first claim for relief is under the Torture Victim Protection Act.
Id. at 20. The second, third, and fourth claims for relief are individual Fifth Amendment
due process claims. Id. at 20-24.
166. See Memorandum in Support of the United States' Assertion of State-secrets
Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. CV-04-0249 DGT VVP, 2006 WL 346439 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
16, 2006). The government stated that disclosure surrounding Mr. Arar's claims "would
interfere with foreign relations, reveal intelligence-gathering sources or methods, and be
detrimental to national security." Id. at 2-3. As such, the government concluded that
"plaintiff cannot prove his claims and defendants are deprived of information critical to
their defense." Id. at 15.
167. Arar, 2006 WL 346439, at *35.
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such information could be maintained without prejudicing [his] ability to
hear and fairly respond to plaintiff's arguments.
1 68
In his analysis, Judge Trager held that three out of four claims in Mr.
Arar's complaint should be dismissed, for reasons unrelated to the state-
secrets privilege.169 As such, "the issue involving state secrets is moot" as
related to the first three claims. 170 Yet, the fourth claim, which alleged
that Mr. Arar "suffered outrageous, excessive, cruel, inhumane and
degrading conditions of confinement in the United States, was subjected
to coercive and involuntary custodial interrogation and deprived of
access to lawyers and courts, in violation of the Fifth Amendment,"
171
was not dismissed with prejudice.172 The court noted that the government
did not seek to use the state-secrets privilege specifically against the
fourth claim.1 73 However, the individuals named in the lawsuit "have
asserted that all counts-including 4-must be dismissed against them in
light of the invocation of privilege by the United States. 1 74 Yet, the
court reasoned that "[b]ecause ... the issue of state secrets is of little or
no relevance, the individually named defendants' assertion that Count 4
must be dismissed with respect to them in light of the privilege is denied
at this time.' ,1 75 Thus, the district court's decision provides some hope
that at least some judges are willing to tease out difficult issues in cases
before them and not simply use the state-secrets privilege as a blanket of
cover for the government.
II. PROPOSALS TO PREVENT ABUSE OF THE STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE
Others have already addressed the potential problem of abuse of the




171. Id. at *6.
172. Id. at *35. The court stated that "[i]n sum, Count 4, construed most favorably to
plaintiff, alleges a possible 'gross physical abuse' due process violation and perhaps a
limited denial of access to counsel right (apart from the rendition aspect of the claim)."
Id. at *34. It is important to note that, according to the court, the existing statutory and
case law was unable to extend protection to Mr. Arar's claims regarding torture in Syria.
Id. at *35. However, the court was willing to hold that if Mr. Arar could "identify the
specific injury he was prevented from grieving," id., without referring to the torture in
Syria or the rendition program, he would be able to state a claim specific to his treatment
in the United States, id. at *34. Thus, the fourth claim that still exists as of publication of
this article is relatively narrow in that it focuses only on Mr. Arar's treatment in the
United States, but not to his treatment in Syria. Id.
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A. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509 as Guidance
The Federal Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence proposed
Rule 509, which related specifically to the state-secrets privilege.'
7 6
Section (e) of the proposed rule 509 provided:
176. FED. R. EVID. 509 (proposed draft), reprinted in DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1162-65 (rev. ed. 1985).
Proposed Rule 509 states in its entirety:
SECRETS OF STATE AND OTHER OFFICIAL INFORMATION
(a) Definitions
(1) Secret of state. A "secret of state" is a governmental secret relating to
the national defense or the international relations of the United States.
(2) Official information. "Official information" is information within the
custody or control of a department or agency of the government the disclosure of
which is shown to be contrary to the public interest and which consists of: (A)
intragovernmental opinions or recommendations submitted for consideration in
the performance of decisional or policymaking functions, or (B) subject to the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3500, investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes and not otherwise available, or (C) information within the custody or
control of a governmental department or agency whether initiated within the
department or agency or acquired by it in its exercise of its official
responsibilities and not otherwise available to the public pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
552.
(b) General rule of privilege. The government has a privilege to refuse to
give evidence and to prevent any person from giving evidence upon a showing of
reasonable likelihood of danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of state or
official information, as defined in this rule.
(c) Procedures. The privilege for secrets of state may be claimed only by the
chief officer of the government agency or department administering the subject
matter which the secret information sought concerns, but the privilege for official
information may be asserted by any attorney representing the government. The
required showing may be made in whole or in part in the form of a written
statement. The judge may hear the matter in chambers, but all counsel are
entitled to inspect the claim and showing and to be heard thereon, except that, in
the case of secrets of state, the judge upon motion of the government, may
permit the government to make the required showing in the above form in
camera. If the judge sustains the privilege upon a showing in camera, the entire
text of the government's statements shall be sealed and preserved in the court's
records in the event of appeal. In the case of privilege claimed for official
information the court may require examination in camera of the information
itself. The judge may take any protective measure which the interests of the
government and the furtherance of justice may require.
(d) Notice to government. If the circumstances of the case indicate a
substantial possibility that a claim of privilege would be appropriate but has not
been made because of oversight or lack of knowledge, the judge shall give or
cause notice to be given to the officer entitled to claim the privilege and shall
stay further proceedings a reasonable time to afford opportunity to assert a claim
of privilege.
(e) Effect of sustaining claim. If a claim of privilege is sustained in a
proceeding to which the government is a party and it appears that another party
is thereby deprived of material evidence, the judge shall make any further orders
which the interests of justice require, including striking the testimony of a
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If a claim of privilege is sustained in a proceeding to which the
government is a party and it appears that another party is
thereby deprived of material evidence, the judge shall make any
further orders which the interests of justice require, including
striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding
against the government upon an issue as to which the evidence
is relevant, or dismissing the action.
177
Thus, the proposed rule provided for judicial procedures when the
"interests of justice require" because a party was "deprived of material
evidence" due to invocation of the state-secrets privilege. 7 8  Although
acknowledging that the state-secrets privilege could be used to dismiss a
case,7 9 the Advisory Committee Notes stated that, in cases where the
state-secrets privilege is invoked by the government to block privileged
material relating to the plaintiff's claim against the government, prior
case law indicated "an unwillingness to allow the government's claim of
privilege for secrets of state to be used as an offensive weapon."'
8
Congress, however, never adopted proposed Rule 509.181 Legislative
history suggests that there was considerable controversy surrounding
rules related to specific privileges. Instead, Federal Rule of Evidence
501 was adopted, which is a more simplified version and does not
specifically recognize the state-secrets privilege.'83
Despite the fact that Rule 509 was never adopted, one author believes
that the proposed Rule 509 may still provide guidance on how to
witness, declaring a mistrial, finding against the government upon an issue as to
which the evidence is relevant, or dismissing the action.
Id., reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE app. A at 1162-63 (rev. ed. 1985).
177. Id. § (e), reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985).
178. Id., reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985).
179. Id. advisory committee's note, reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1165 (rev. ed. 1985).
180. Id., reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE app. A at 1165 (rev. ed. 1985).
181. See Askin, supra note 30, at 770.
182. See id. According to the author, the legislative history illustrated that the
proposed privilege rule was "'extremely controversial."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277,
at 6 (1974)). In addition, the author summarized that since no one could agree on a
specific privilege rule, thereby threatening to prevent other rules from passing, a more
watered-down or generalized version of the rule was passed in Rule 501. See id.
183. See id. ("Congress instead adopted a bare-bones Rule 501, which provides that
privileges in the federal courts shall be determined according to 'the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted . . .in the light of reason and experience."'
(alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)).
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interpret Rule 501.'m' To support this assertion, the author points to
Liuzzo v. United States,18' where a district judge relied on proposed Rule
509, specifically section (e), as guidance on whether to admit a
government record when the government sought to block it from
discovery.'86 In Liuzzo, the government asserted an executive privilege,
specifically the "deliberative process" privilege, which "protects from
discovery 'intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.", 187 The court
stated that it "must accommodate the government's professed need for
secrecy with the plaintiffs' need to prove their case.",188 First, the court
stated that the government did not need to show the contested report in189
camera. The court reasoned that "[tihis approach reduces judicial
interference in the internal workings and autonomy of the executive
branch, and gives due regard to the formal claim of privilege asserted by
the Attorney General." 190  However, the court recognized that the
plaintiffs' needs must also be addressed. 9' If the plaintiffs could establish
on remand that removal of the contested report from discovery deprives
them of material evidence as set forth in proposed Rule 509, then "the
court [would] follow the suggested procedure in Rule 509(e) and enter a
finding of liability on the part of the defendant.', 9 2 The rationale behind
this procedure would be followed "to reconcile the competing interests"
involved in the case.'93 The court stated that "[wihen government claims
the right to refuse information as to its conduct on the theory that harm
184. See id. at 771 ("Even though parts of the proposed rule engendered serious
controversy, there is authority that they provide guidance as to how privileges are to be
determined and implemented under Rule 501.").
185. 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981). In Liuzzo, plaintiffs brought an action
against the FBI, alleging that the agency was responsible for the murder of the plaintiffs'
mother, Ms. Viola Liuzzo. Id. at 926. In 1965, Ms. Liuzzo went to Alabama to participate
in a voting rights march. Id. While traveling to the march, members of the Ku Klux Klan
shot and killed Ms. Liuzzo. Id. One of the persons present with the Ku Klux Klan when
they shot her was Gary Thomas Rowe, an FBI informant. Id.
186. Id. at 939. The report was the result of an investigation of the FBI by the Office
of Professional Responsibility, which delved into the FBI's handling of Mr. Rowe as an
informant. Id. at 936.
187. Id. at 937 (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318,
324 (D.D.C. 1966)). The Attorney General asserted a formal claim of privilege because,
he argued, "the disclosure of the report would jeopardize not only the deliberative
processes involved in this investigation but in other investigations as well." Id. at 939.
188. Id. at 939.
189. Id. at 940.
190. Id.
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would come to its efforts to protect society, that same society can
recompense plaintiffs for their injuries.,
194
The court further explained that "this approach is appropriate in this
type of case because it allows plaintiffs to realize their goals-the award
of money damages for their losses-while not intruding on the internal
processes of the executive branch."' 95 However, the court warned in
dicta that the approach used in this case may not be appropriate for
state-secrets cases.96  The court distinguished between the privileged
materials involved in Liuzzo, which related to internal policies, from
privileged materials relating to state-secrets.197 The court recognized that
disclosure in state-secrets cases could potentially "jeopardize the security
or welfare of this nation.""
One author suggested that the approach used in Liuzzo may be
appropriate for cases involving state-secrets, despite the court's
hesitation. 99 Professor Askin argued that the approach used by the court
permits the government to maintain its secrets and allows plaintiffs
compensation. Thus, "'in the interest of justice,"' if the remedy does
not force disclosure, it should not matter "whether the claim of privilege
is based on a military secret or some other reason.,
201
B. Judicial Procedural Tools
Another author made a similar proposal to the suggestion that judges
202
should follow proposed Rule 509. Proposed Rule 509, in essence,
provides judicial procedural tools to help compensate a litigant when an
asserted privilege by the government blocks "essential material., 20 3 This
author suggested that judicial procedural tools such as protective
194. Id. at 941.
195. Id. at 940. The court added that the government was not "unduly penalized" by
the decision. Id.
196. Id. at 940-41.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 940.
199. See Askin, supra note 30, at 772.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Note, supra note 15, at 586-89.
203. See FED. R. EVID. 509 (proposed draft), reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LoUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1162-1165 (rev. ed. 1985).
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orders2 0 in camera proceedings,05 construing facts in favor of the
deprived litigant, and shifting burdens against the government were all
legitimate ways to help support the deprived litigant after the state-
secrets privilege had been upheld in favor of the government.' °6 The
author suggested that if protective orders or in camera proceedings are
not sufficient to protect national security, courts could create a summary
of documents upon which litigation could occur .2  The author drew this
204. A protective order is defined as "[a] court order prohibiting or restricting a party
from engaging in conduct (esp. a legal procedure such as discovery) that unduly annoys or
burdens the opposing party or a third-party witness." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1260
(8th ed. 2004).
205. In camera is defined as "1. In the judge's private chambers. 2. In the courtroom
with all spectators excluded. 3. (Of a judicial action) taken when court is not in session."
Id. at 775.
206. See Note, supra note 15, at 587-88.
207. Id. at 588 n.91. The author cited In re Attorney General of the United States, 596
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1979) in support of this suggestion. Id. In In re Attorney General, the
plaintiffs were the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), its affiliate, the Young Socialist
Alliance (YSA), and some individual members. In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d at 60. The
plaintiffs alleged that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the FBI unlawfully investigated
their organizations "with the purpose of disrupting or destroying them." Id. The
investigation of these organizations involved approximately 1300 informants, 300 of which
were members of the SWP or YSA. Id. During the pre-trial stages, one of the informant's
files became public for reasons unrelated to the case. Id. at 60 n.1. The plaintiffs
compared the now public file to answers to interrogatories they had received from the
government. Id. The comparison proved that the government had failed to make
important disclosures, namely that the informant "had removed documents from SWP and
YSA offices." Id. The plaintiffs then demanded production of additional informants' files
to ensure the accuracy of the government's discovery responses. Id. at 60. The trial judge
ordered that the government show opposing counsel summaries of the informants' files.
Id. After a failed compromise between the government and the trial court, the Attorney
General refused to comply with the disclosure order. Id. at 60-61. Similar to a state-
secrets privilege case where secrecy is critical, the government was concerned with
releasing the informants' names in breach of a confidentiality pledge the FBI makes with
its informants. Id. at 64 n.11. The government feared that breach of this confidentiality
"would signal to other informants and potential informants that the United States would
not or could not continue to honor the pledge of confidentiality which has been the
cornerstone of its relationship .... thereby adversely affecting the ability of other law
enforcement agencies." Id.
Somewhat boldly, the trial court placed the Attorney General under civil contempt for
failure to comply with the discovery order, despite the government's concerns. Id. at 61.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed, among other issues,
whether the contempt order was proper and whether other, better, options were available.
Id. at 65. The court summarized available sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b)(2):
(1) an order that "designated facts shall be taken to be established"; (2) an order
"refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims
or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evidence"; and (3) an order "striking out pleadings or parts thereof . . . or
rendering a judgment by default."
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suggestion from a case where the government was sanctioned for non-S 208
compliance with a discovery order, which is different than a case
involving a state-secrets privilege.2 In a state-secrets privilege case, the
government invokes a "special legal right" 210-which is very different
from failing to comply with a judicial order to produce discovery.1
However, even though the state-secrets privilege involves no wrongdoing
on the government's part, the effect of refusing to comply with a
discovery request and invocation of the state-secrets privilege is often the
same-a claimant may be left without the ability to proceed on an
otherwise meritorious claim. The proposal to use sanitized summaries
of privileged information or proposed findings of fact designed to negate
the withholding of privileged information by the government should
offset the harshness that often results from invocation of the state-secrets
213privilege.
C. Specialized Courts
One author has suggested that a specialized court would aid judges in
balancing between the need to protect national security and the need to
214protect a person's basic right to due process. The court could be
modeled after the current Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC).215 The FISC specializes in approving government collection of
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)). Because options other than
contempt were available, the court overruled the contempt order. Id. at 67. Then, the
appellate court ordered that the lower court use alternate sanctions "which, so far as
possible, put plaintiffs in the position that they would have been in if the Government had
disclosed the information." Id. The appellate court suggested that the "district court
produce[] a set of representative findings from the informant files for the benefit of the
plaintiffs." Id. The appellate court even drew up sample fill-in-the-blank templates which
the government could use to show the number of informants present at a meeting, for
example, without disclosing their identities. Id. app. at 68.
208. See supra note 207.
209. See In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d at 60-62 (detailing several government defenses
but none involving the state-secrets privilege).
210. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (8th ed. 2004) (defining privilege).
211. See, e.g., supra note 207 (discussing a case involving non-compliance with
discovery order).
212. Compare supra note 207 (discussing a case involving non-compliance with
discovery order), with United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3-4, 7-8 (1953) (involving the
state-secrets privilege blocking an accident report from discovery).
213. See In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d at 68-69.
214. See Silverman, supra note 15, at 1124-27.
215. Id. at 1124-25. The author explained that "[t]he FISC was created under the
Foreign Intelligence Survey Act ('FISA') in response to the domestic spying scandals of
the Nixon era." Id. at 1124. The Rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court are
available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot-foia/2003/court-rules.pdf.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
foreign intelligence, t6 and "'deliberates behind ... spy-proof doors in a
windowless, vault-like room in the headquarters of the Department of
Justice.',, 217  Although the standard for invoking the privilege would
remain the same, judges on a special court would be able to ask more
questions and "feel more comfortable in criticizing classification
decisions that seem dubious or overbroad. ,18  In addition, the court
would use judges who were experts in the field."9 Also, a specialized
court would promote expedited dockets.220  Thus, even critical issues
arising during a military conflict could be dealt with quickly and would
not become moot before appearing before the court. 21 While this is a
solid proposal for a long term solution, a more immediate solution is
necessary for current cases such as Arar and Edmonds.
D. The Comparative Standard
One author proposed that judges should look at the litigant's need for
the information, in addition to the sensitivity of the information sought,
in order to determine whether to accept invocation of the state-secrets
privilege. Under the current analysis, a litigant's need for the
information is used only to determine the scrutiny a judge will apply to
determine if the privilege should be granted.23  For example, if a
litigant's need for the controversial discovery is high, then the judge may
require an in camera review of the item before determining whether to
grant the privilege.224 If the need is low, then the judge may grant the
216. Silverman, supra note 15 at 1125-26. The hearings are non-adversarial. Id. at
1125. Rather, the government "presents applications to conduct surveillance." Id.
217. Id. at 1125 (alteration in original) (quoting Paul DeRienzo & Joan Moossy,
America's Secret Court, http://www.penthouse.com/features/9906fLsecretcourt/index2.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003)).
218. Id. at 1126.
219. Id. The author suggests that "[f]ederal legislation creating a lottery system to
designate already appointed civilian federal judges" to this new court "could be a starting
point." Id. The author explained that FISA "mandates that the 'Chief Justice of the
United States ... publicly designate 11 district court judges from 7 of the United States
judicial circuits of whom no fewer than 3 reside within 20 miles of the District of
Columbia."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000)). The author
suggests that the lottery system would be better for the hypothetical court because it
would avoid a pro-Republican or a pro-Democrat Chief Justice from filling the court with
only judges of the same party. See id. The author also suggests that the judges for the
hypothetical court would be trained on classification procedures, have secure chambers,
trained staff, and they "should be able to hire former intelligence or military experts to
serve as special masters." Id.
220. Id. at 1127.
221. Id.
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privilege without even seeing the item.225 However, the standard for
upholding the privilege is the same in both scenarios-whether there is
any threat against national security.211 If a threat is found, "even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the privilege., 2 7 Thus, under the
current analysis, a small threat to national security can trump a litigant's
large need for the evidence to proceed with the case. 228  The author
suggested that the litigant's need for the evidence should be weighed at
an early stage of the analysis to avoid unnecessarily removing evidence,
or worse, stopping litigation from proceeding.229
While the comparative standard analysis is interesting, it does not offer
assistance where the government demands dismissal of a claim before
there is evidence to weigh. Edmonds illustrates this point. Ms. Edmonds
argues that she can litigate even without the allegedly privileged report.3
Where the government successfully relies on the Totten standard, the
case is dismissed and the claimant is thereby deprived access to the
comparative standard for assistance.3' As a result, the suggested
comparative standard analysis is relevant only where the government's
assertion of the privilege is confined to a piece of evidence as opposed to
232cases where the government seeks to bar the litigation.
E. The Reynolds Standard for Judicial Review
The trend of increased dismissals based on the state-secrets privilege




228. See id. at 574-75.
229. See id. at 584-86.
230. Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at 27-37, Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-5286).
231. See id. at 17-19.
232. See id.
233. See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 87. Weaver and Pallitto noted that "[t]he
privilege seems to be ultra-constitutional, for the courts have not forced the government to
disclose agency-held classified information in any case in which the privilege has been
asserted, even when the basis for compulsion has been the assertions of a constitutional
right." Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 47-56.
Professor Sunstein argued that, especially during national emergencies, two polar
positions can be taken. Id. at 47-50. The first is described as "National Security
Maximalism." Id. at 49-50. The author explained that "National Security Maximalists
understand the Constitution to call for a highly deferential role for the judiciary, above all
on the ground that when national security is threatened, the President must be permitted
to do what needs to be done to protect the country." Id. Liberty Maximalists, on the
other hand, "insist that in times of war, at least as much as in times of peace, federal judges
must protect constitutional liberty." Id. at 50. While the author ultimately embraces what
he argued as an intermediate position, a so-called "minimalist position," id. at 51, he
2006]
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This result follows from the judiciary's inclination to give "utmost
deference" to the executive branch . While a court's desire to maintain
secrecy is understandable, 235 "[t]he deference emanating from Reynolds
towards claims of national security leads to failures of [judicial] oversight
that threaten our constitutional arrangement of powers., 236 By not acting
as a final check, "courts double the damage." 237 Based on the gradual
upswing of cases dismissed on the basis of the state-secrets privilege,""
and especially in light of the dramatic fact patterns seen in more recent
cases like Edmonds and Arar, a reexamination of judicial deference is
warranted.
recognized that "unmistakable forms of National Security Maximalism, rather than an
intermediate approach, can be found in several places in recent years." Id. Indeed, the
author cited to Edmonds as one example of National Security Maximalism. Id. at 63.
234. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("As to these areas of Art. II
duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities. ").
235. See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 89 ("Agency officials argue, and courts
often agree, that judges and lay people are incompetent to assess the danger that the
release of information may pose to national security....").
236. Id. at 102-03; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter
stated:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable
degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in
between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose
particular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is
not the branch on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory ....
A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different
branch ......
Id. Professor Sunstein also argued that too much judicial deference (or what he referred
to as National Security Maximalism) "understates the risks of unlimited presidential
authority." Sunstein, supra note 233, at 69. One risk includes the notion that because the
executive branch is run by one person, who is "constitutionally entitled to fill his branch
with like-minded people," this branch is subject to the problem of "groupthink." Id. at 69-
72. In other words, "like-minded people tend to end up thinking a more extreme version
of what they thought before deliberation began." Id. at 69. For example, commenting on
a 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report, Sunstein stated that the CIA's
"predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it to fail to explore alternative
possibilities or to obtain and use the information that it actually held." Id. at 71. The
Committee specifically accused the CIA of "groupthink." Id. at 70-71. A second risk
resulting from too much judicial deference occurs where liberties are taken from only
certain groups as opposed to "all or most." Id. at 72. Where liberties are taken from "all
or most," it is likely that enough force will be present in the general public to make
necessary changes in the government through the election process. Id. However, if only
portions of the population are affected, "the political check is weakened." Id.
237. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 11, at 103.
238. See supra note 74.
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III. PROPOSAL TO PREVENT ABUSE OF THE STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE:
AMEND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO INCLUDE CHECKS ON
THE STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE WHILE ADDRESSING LEGITIMATE
LEGISLATIVE CONCERNS ABOUT PRESERVING THE PRIVILEGE
Although the first attempt failed in the 1970s to create a federal rule of1 39
evidence specifically addressing the state-secrets privilege, Congress
should again attempt to provide guidance and balance in light of theS•• 240
increased use of the state-secrets privilege, the Tenet distinction- I 241
between the Totten rule and the state-secrets privilege, recent signs of
potential over-classification, and extreme cases like Arar v. Ashcroft.243
A new rule, created by Congress, would also act as an additional check
on the apparently growing executive power.2" The new rule can be
largely based on the proposed Rule 509 as a starting point, 245 but it should
also address each of these newer issues.
For example, the new rule could take the following form:
Rule X. The Military and State-Secrets Privilege.
(a) General rule of privilege. The government has a privilege to
239. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
242. See supra note 90.
243. No. CV-04-0249 DGT VVP, 2006 WL 346439 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2006); see also
supra notes 138-66 and accompanying text. Mr. Arar's attorneys argued that "[i]t is one
thing to invoke the state-secrets privilege to bar litigation of an employment dispute; it is
another matter entirely to permit its invocation to immunize government officials from
allegations that they were complicit in torture and prolonged arbitrary detention."
Plaintiff Maher Arar's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Invocation of
the State-secrets Privilege at 31, Arar, 2006 WL 346439 (No. CV-04-0249 DGT VVP).
The attorneys further stated that "[a] government should not be able to shield itself from
accusations of genocide, slavery, torture, or prolonged arbitrary detention by claiming that
its decisions to engage in the conduct are secret." Id. at 32. Finally, the attorneys argued
that "while the state-secrets privilege has been described as 'absolute,' there must be a
point at which even its limits have been surpassed." Id.
244. See Sunstein, supra note 233, at 76-77 (arguing the importance of a minimalist
judicial approach during wartime in which the judiciary should look to see if the executive
and the congressional branches are in sync). The importance of involving the legislative
branch is compounded by Alexander Hamilton's view that "[t]he judiciary is beyond
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with
success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend
itself against their attacks." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan ed., 2001) (footnote omitted). However, the role
of the judiciary is not to be overly minimized. See id. at 405-06. Hamilton also stated that
"judges may be an essential safe-guard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the
society." Id. at 406. In addition, Hamilton stated that the judiciary "not only serves to
moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as
a check upon the legislative body in passing them." Id.
245. See supra note 176.
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refuse to give evidence and to prevent any person from giving
evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that
the evidence will result in a threat to the national security of the
246United States government. However, the privilege is "not to be
lightly invoked.
2 47
(b) Procedures. The privilege must be in writing and lodged by the
head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer.248  If possible,
counsel for all relevant parties involved in the lawsuit should be
permitted to view the privileged information. If this is not
possible due to national security concerns, then the judge should
opt to use protective orders or in camera proceedings as a means
to maintain the case and protect national security. 2 0  The
government should make a minimal showing that the document is
not over-classified . If the judge sustains the privilege upon a
showing in camera, the entire text of the government's statements
shall be sealed and preserved in the court's records in the event of
212appeal.
(c) Distinction from the Totten rule. If the government argues that a
246. This line of Proposed Rule X was largely'taken from Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 509(b). FED. R. EVID. 509(b) (proposed draft), reprinted in 2 DAVID W.
LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1162 (rev. ed.
1985).
247. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953)
248. Except for the writing requirement, this language was taken directly from United
States v. Reynolds. Id. at 8.
249. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(c) discussed this notion. FED. R. EVID.
509(c) (proposed draft), reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985). The relevant portion
stated that
[tihe judge may hear the matter in chambers, but all counsel are entitled to
inspect the claim and showing and to be heard thereon, except that, in the case of
secrets of state, the judge upon motion of the government, may permit the
government to make the required showing in the above form in camera.
Id., reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985).
250. See id., reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed, 1985). The relevant portion of the rule
stated that "[i]n the case of privilege claimed for official information the court may require
examination in camera of the information itself." Id., reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL
& CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985); see
also Note, supra note 15, at 582, at 582 (suggesting that courts should use protective orders
and in camera hearings in response to state-secrets privilege claims).
251. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
252. This line was taken directly from Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(c).
FED. R. EVID. 509(c) (proposed draft), reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985).
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case should be dismissed at the pleadings stage, prior to discovery,
the government ought to proceed under the Totten rule, which is
distinct from the state-secrets privilege as clarified in Tenet v.
Doe.53 However, if the government argues that a portion of
discovery should be blocked, due to national security concerns,
then the government should proceed using the state-secrets
privilege as prescribed in section (b) of this Rule.
(d) Effect of invoked claim upheld. If the government properly
invokes the state-secrets privilege and it is upheld, thereby
depriving a party of critical evidence, the judge shall make any
further orders which the interests of justice require.2 The orders
may include striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a
mistrial, or finding against the government upon an issue as to
which the evidence is relevant.21' The judge should dismiss the
trial only under extreme circumstances where none of the above-
stated or other suggestions will protect national security.
IV. CONCLUSION
The increasing number of cases involving the state-secrets privilege,
especially those resulting in dismissal at the pleadings stage, the Tenet
holding, possible over-classification resulting in an overly-broad use of
the privilege, and cases like Arar are all reasons why Congress should
revisit the state-secrets privilege issue. A new rule of evidence
addressing the state-secrets privilege, incorporating legitimate state
concerns and addressing new problems, would help contain the
expansion of the state-secrets privilege.
253. 125 S. Ct. 1230 (2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
254. This line was largely taken from Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(e). FED.
R. EVID. 509(e) (proposed draft), reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985).
255. This line was directly taken from Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(e).
FED. R. EVID. 509(e) (proposed draft), reprinted in 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE app. A at 1163 (rev. ed. 1985).
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